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by Paul Silva Jr.

Abstract The special composition question asks under what conditions composition occurs. Some metaphysicians say that any disjoint objects compose another, yet others say that no two objects compose another. The common sense view is that composition only occurs among some things and that all and only “ordinary objects” exist. Many deny the common sense view on broadly explanatory grounds, but van Inwagen has marshaled a devastating argument against this view. For the common sense view appears to commit one to giving what van Inwagen calls a “series-style answer” to the special composition question. But van Inwagen argues that series-style answers are logically impossible because they are inconsistent with the transitivity of the parthood relation. In this paper I demonstrate that series-style answers can be consistent with parthood's transitivity and that they can also avoid a further logical objection, the problem of disjoint decomposition. Finally, I show that some other dangling problems raised by van Inwagen for series-style answers have natural answers. The upshot is that there may yet be a way of answering the special composition question that affirms the existence of all and only ordinary objects.






A common sense ontology is, quite roughly, one that countenances the existence of all and only “ordinary objects.” I have no explanatorily useful definition of that class of objects, but it's meant to include those things we take to populate our shopping carts and homes as well as whatever objects the best possible scientific theory says exist. Van Inwagen has offered a devastating argument to the effect that no such ontology can be correct. For to have a common sense ontology one must answer the special composition question in a particular way, i.e., one must endorse a series-style answer of some sort or other. But such answers imply that parthood is not a transitive relation. Thus, a common sense ontology requires the abandonment of a rather compelling mereological principle. Indeed, if we take parthood's transitivity as a necessary truth about parthood, it would seem that a common sense ontology is not just mistaken, but impossible.​[1]​
	This paper aims to dislodge this difficulty. Section 1 explains the special composition question. Section 2 explains and motivates the idea that the correct answer to that question is a series-style answer. Section 3 introduces van Inwagen's transitivity difficulty. Section 4 offers the beginnings of a solution that promises to avoid not only van Inwagen's transitivity difficulty but also a further, equally troubling logical problem facing series-style answers, the problem of disjoint decomposition. Sections 5 and 6 deal with some additional concerns and provide the eventual solution for series-style answers to the special composition question. Section 7 addresses other objections to series-style answers raised by van Inwagen. 


	Note that the aim in what follows is not to defend any particular series-style answer to the special composition question, but rather to dislodge a series of objections which have (and should have) caused some to despair of having a common sense ontology.
1 The special composition question

It is natural to suppose that ordinary objects exist (bricks, planks, cells, atoms) and can themselves go on to compose other objects (houses, ships, plants, humans). Peter van Inwagen has investigated this supposition by drawing attention to what he calls the special composition question (SCQ). This question asks for necessary and jointly sufficient conditions any things must satisfy in virtue of which they compose something else. We can view this question as a request to fill in the following schema:

	Special Composition Schema
	Necessarily, for any xs (there is some x such that the xs compose y iff ).​[2]​






	The xs compose y =df the xs are all parts of y, every part of y overlaps at least one 	of the xs, and no two of the xs overlap.​[3]​

Yet a point of clarification is needed. The search for an answer to the SCQ is not the search for mere necessary and sufficient conditions some things must satisfy in order to compose another, but for those necessary and sufficient conditions in virtue of which some things compose another.​[4]​ Thus, not every true instance of the above schema will be such that it adequately answers the SCQ. Suppose, for example, one simply inserted the sentence `there is some y that the xs compose' for PHI. Although this yields a trivially true instance of the special composition schema, it yields a non-trivial answer to the special composition question because it appears to imply that facts about composition obtain in virtue of themselves.​[5]​
Series-style answers to the SCQ

Different answers have been proposed in response to the SCQ. The class of moderate (or restricted) answers deny both that disjoint objects never compose anything (mereological nihilism) and that any disjoint objects compose something (mereological universalism). Common sense plainly prefers moderate answers vis-a-vis nihilism and universalism for neither of these later views entail that all and only ordinary objects exist.
	Series-style answers are a kind of moderate answer to the SCQ and the best way to introduce series-style answers is as a response to two problems any answer to the SCQ can face. The first is the odd object problem, which is a problem an answer to the SCQ faces when it implies the existence of objects that, intuitively, do not exist. The second problem is the ordinary object problem, which is a problem an answer to the SCQ faces when it implies the non-existence of objects that, intuitively, do exist. Here's a sample answer to the SCQ that faces both problems:

	(Bonding) the xs are bonded.

(Bonding) as an answer to the SCQ tells us that an there is an object y composed of the xs if and only if the xs are bonded. For present purposes, bonding is some kind of degreed physical relation that requires, but is stronger than, mere contact.​[6]​ Examples of the kinds of relations that can bring it about that the xs are bonded will include tying, nailing, gluing, welding, and grafting.
	Part of the attraction to (Bonding) is that it seems to get some things right. For example, pieces of cloth may be bonded by being sewn together so as to form a shirt, or a blanket, or just a larger piece of cloth. Or again, wooden planks can be bonded together by nailing so as to form a cross. But the odd object problem quickly surfaces for it's counterintuitive to think that by sewing a turkey to a trout one thereby brings anything into existence. Likewise, it's counterintuitive to think that by nailing persons to crosses one thereby brings anything into existence. The ordinary object problem also surfaces for (Bonding), for there are objects such as solar systems, atoms, and perhaps temporally scattered objects which exist but have parts that are not in contact and thus fail to be bonded.
	Series-style answers to the SCQ are, in virtue of their form, suited to avoiding both the odd object problem and the ordinary object problem. A series-style answer is any answer to the SCQ that has the following form:

	(Series) the xs are F1 and stand in R1, or the xs are F2 and stand in R2, or ..., or 	the xs are Fn and stand in Rn, or there is only one of the xs.​[7]​

Here, `F1...Fn' stand for kind-terms (or conjunctions or disjunctions of kind-terms), and `R1...Rn' stand for multigrade relations (or conjunctions or disjunctions of such relations). What it is that series-style answers have in common is the idea that those necessary and sufficient conditions in virtue of which some things compose another involve reference to the kinds to which those things belong as well as what relations they must stand in if they are to compose anything.
	Thus, series-style answers are able to avoid the odd object problem while permitting an ontology that includes only ordinary objects for a series-style answer can tell us that only certain kinds of objects (pieces of cloth, wooden planks, bricks) compose when bonded, while other objects (persons, turkeys, trouts) compose nothing when bonded. Notice, then, that any series-style answer that avoids the odd object problem is going to entail the following thesis:

Exclusion Thesis
There are some kinds and relations such that a relation sufficient for composition to occur among some kind of things (say, the F1s) is not sufficient for composition to occur among some other (distinct) kind of things (say, the F2s) even if the F2s can stand in the same relation as the F1s when the F1s compose something.

But if an answer to the SCQ is to yield an ontology that includes all and only ordinary objects, it must also be consistent with the following thesis:
Levels-kind Thesis
Some kinds of things (say, the F1s) can be composed of things that are of a distinct kind (say, the F2s).

Consistency with this thesis is needed for common sense has it that certain kinds of things can be composed of things that are of a different kind: molecules are composed atoms, our internal organs are composed of cells, some walls are composed of stones, some chairs are composed of pieces of wood, etc. Thus, in so far as we are interested in an ontology of all and only ordinary objects a series-style answer to the SCQ must be consistent with the Levels-Kind Thesis.​[8]​
	Henceforth, whenever series-style answers are referred to it is to be understood that we are referring to the proper subset of series-style answers that entail the Exclusion Thesis and are consistent with the Levels-Kind Thesis. It is this proper subset of answers that seem to have the ability to avoid the odd object problem and the ordinary object problem. But it is also just these sorts of answers that face van Inwagen's transitivity difficulty.​[9]​

3 The transitivity difficulty

To see how series-style answers might be inconsistent with parthood's transitivity let us take an oversimplified example where our aim is to state the composition conditions for trees.​[10]​ Fictitiously, we will assume that there are only two kinds of things that figure into the composition conditions for trees: particles and cellulose molecules. The conditions involving these are as follows: some particles compose a cellulose molecule just when they stand in the nuclear relation, N, and we will suppose some cellulose molecules compose a tree just when they stand in the bio-chemical relation, B. Hence, it is the case that some group of distinct objects compose another if they are atoms and stand in N or they are cellulose molecules and stand in B. Since we are taking that portion of the world that consists only of trees--and therefore the particles and cellulose molecules that compose trees--we can express the conditions for when composition occurs at this treeish portion of the world with the following biconditional:​[11]​

(A) For any xs [there is some y such that the xs compose y iff: (the xs are particles and stand in N) or (the xs are cellulose molecules and stand in B) or (there is only one of the xs)].

The right-hand-side of (A) represents an instance of (Series). Now, we make two further assumptions to accord with the remaining theses characteristic of the type of series-style answers we are interested in, i.e., the Exclusion and Levels-Kinds Theses:





(ii) Trees are composed of cellulose molecules, and cellulose molecules are composed of particles.

Finally, we invoke two intuitive mereological theses, the first states that parthood is a transitive relation, and the second gives conditions for when one thing counts as a proper part of another:

(iii) Parthood is a transitive relation.​[12]​

(iv) x is a proper part of y iff there are zs other than x such that x and the zs compose y.​[13]​

Van Inwagen has shown that (A) and (i)-(iv) are inconsistent. Quickly put, the problem is that (A), (i), and (ii) fail to include a condition for when a collection of particles may compose a tree, and thus no particle is among anythings that compose a tree. But, then, by the right-to-left direction of (iv) it follows that no particle is a proper part of any tree. But from the transitivity of parthood it follows that every particle is a proper part of a tree when it is a proper part of any cellulose molecule that is a proper part of that tree. Hence contradiction.
	Let's make the problem even more explicit. Take some tree, T, composed of distinct cellulose molecules M1, M2, ..., Mn. By the right-to-left direction of (iv), T has M1 as a proper part. By (ii) and (iv), M1 has some particle, P, as a proper part. Therefore, by the transitivity of parthood ((iii)), P is a proper part of T. Now, since P is a proper part of T (iv) requires that P be among some things that compose T. Yet (A) and (i) entail that particles only compose something when they are in the nuclear relation N,​[14]​ which, given (ii), is sufficient only for composing molecules. But then P is not among any things that compose T, and therefore, by the right-to-left direction of (iv), P is not a proper part of T. So P is and is not a proper part of T. We've reached contradiction: (A) and (i)-(iv) form an inconsistent set.
	This is the transitivity difficulty, and van Inwagen has argued that it creates a dilemma: either the correct answer to the SCQ is not a series-style answer or parthood is not transitive. The trouble is that an ontology of all and only ordinary objects seems to require a series-style answer, but if we hang on to such answers our hand is forced against parthood's transitivity on pain of contradiction. The transitivity of parthood is very widely endorsed and the case for it will not be evaluated here.​[15]​ I forgo discussion partly because the aim of this paper is only to defend the consistency of series-style answers with parthood's transitivity, but also because even if parthood is not transitive in general, it remains intuitive to think that there is a limited range of cases, including the present case, in which it is transitive. How could a knuckle be part of one's finger and one's finger be part of one's hand, but that knuckle not be part of one's hand? So even if our love for ordinary objects led us to deny parthood's transitivity, we would likely still face the very problem we sought to avoid.​[16]​
	It must be noted that, strictly speaking, it is not a dilemma but a trilemma we are facing since contradiction can be avoided by denying (iv) also. Yet this will prove to be a hard option. For although (iv) is a highly intuitive principle, the case for it doesn't rest on its intuitiveness alone.​[17]​ It can be shown that (iv) is entailed by some fundamental and widely accepted principles of plural logics, of which mereology is one.​[18]​ Accordingly, I will assume there is no solution to the transitivity difficulty to be found in the denial of (iv). 
	If we are, then, to retain (iii) and (iv), how else might we solve the transitivity difficulty without giving up series-style answers and with them a common sense ontology?​[19]​

4 Towards a solution: recursion

Happily, the transitivity difficulty can be dissolved by adding a suitable recursive clause to (A)'s right-hand-side, thereby yielding a new answer for when composition occurs at the treeish portion of the world. However, before suggesting what I take to be the correct recursive clause it will be instructive to consider a preliminary “solution” that is initially plausible, is able to transparently solve the transitivity difficulty, and can also easily resolve a further logical problem facing series-style answers.


	Here's the sample solution:






(A*1) the xs are particles and stand in N, or 


(A*2) the xs are cellulose molecules and stand in B, or







(A*4) there are some zs and some w such that (the zs compose w and the xs and the zs occupy exactly the same regions of space)].

(A*4) can resolve the transitivity difficulty by falsifying the claim that particle P is not among any things that compose tree T. For all of T's cellulose molecules compose it and P is one of the plurality of particles, the ps, that occupy exactly the same regions of space as the cellulose molecules, the cs, that compose T. Thus, by the right-to-left direction of (A*), there is something the ps compose. Now, it's one thing to say the ps compose something, but it's another thing to say they compose T, which is what is needed if we are to resolve the transitivity difficulty. So, do the ps compose T? Yes, it follows from the fact that the cs compose T and that the ps consist of all and only those particles that are parts of the cs.​[20]​ So, by the right-to-left direction of (iv), P is a proper part of T.
	In addition to resolving the transitivity difficulty, the proposed solution resolves a second threat facing series-style answers. Let a `level of disjoint decomposition' be any decomposition of an object into disjoint proper parts. Thus, our mereology entails the following:

(D1) The top-half of any object's proper parts at one level of disjoint decomposition and the bottom-half of its proper parts at another level of disjoint decomposition together compose it.​[21]​,​[22]​

In our original example where van Inwagen's objection was introduced we said that (a) when the xs are particles and stand in the nuclear relation N they compose a cellulose molecule, and that (b) when the xs are cellulose molecules and stand in the bio-chemical relation B they compose a tree. Both of these features of our example have two salient implications given (D1):





(A) For any xs [there is some y such that the xs compose y iff: (the xs are particles and stand in N) or (the xs are cellulose molecules and stand in B) or (there is only one of the xs)].

The problem is that (A), (a), and (b) are inconsistent with (D1a). For (A) has no clause in its right-hand side allowing for collections of things of distinct kinds (particles and molecules) to compose anything. Thus (A) implies that no mixed collection of things compose anything, pace (D1a). Call this the problem of disjoint decomposition.
	It's easy to see how our recursive clause (A^{*}4) provides the fix in our model. For, because of (A*4), (A*) implies that the plurality consisting of the top-half of a tree's particles and the bottom-half of its cellulose molecules (the ms) compose it because all of its cellulose molecules (the cs) compose it and the ms and the cs occupy exactly the same regions of space. Thus, unlike (A), (A^{*}) is consistent with (D1a).​[23]​

5 Problems and improvements

There are three problems with (A*4)'s use of a co-location relation. Problem #1: if the correct answer to the SCQ is a series-style answer that involves (A*4), then it will follow that any two coincident objects compose a further object.​[24]​ Thus if a lump is coincident with a statue, there is some third thing that is not only co-located with the lump and the statue, but is composed of them.​[25]​ I suspect this will be an unattractive consequence, at least for those who endorse the existence of coincident objects.
	Problem #2: if an answer to the SCQ employs (A*4) it will follow that for any two co-located pluralities, the xs and the zs, if the xs compose something then the zs do also. But this may be an undesirable consequence for reasons that have nothing to do with coincidence. Take a bizarre form of co-location: the co-location of objects that share no parts. Suppose you had a rod composed of anti-matter, where the defining characteristics of anti-matter is that it fails to causally interact with objects composed of matter except your hand and it can be co-located with any material objects other than your hand. Thus you could take your anti-matter rod and swing it around and it would pass through any material objects in its path and thereby become temporally co-located with various objects in its path.​[26]​ Suppose at t1 you stuck the rod through your computer monitor and into the wall just behind it. If (A*4) is part of the correct answer to the SCQ, then it follows that the matter co-located with the anti-matter rod at t1 compose some object o. This seems wrong for intuitively there is no object composed of that portion of your monitor, the air, and the wall which are co-located with your rod.​[27]​ Thus, if this form of co-location is a metaphysical possibility, an answer to the SCQ that includes (A*4) will end up facing the odd object problem.
	Problem #3: although the addition of (A*4) is able to resolve the transitivity difficulty and the problem of disjoint decomposition there is some reason to wonder whether (A*4) could ever be part of the correct answer to the SCQ. For (A*) is supposed to model an answer to the SCQ which is a question about what it is in virtue of that anythings might compose another. Thus, despite (A*)'s ability to resolve the above logical difficulties, one might think that (A*4) wrongly brings in considerations of co-location in giving an account of composition. For, plausibly, facts about composition do not depend on facts about co-location, indeed, one would expect the reverse to hold. But if the answer to the SCQ involves (A*4), then it seems that some composition facts will depend at least in part on facts about co-location.​[28]​ This problem may be, to some extent, untroubling because the base clauses are doing the metaphysical heavy lifting since nothing composes anything unless they are first satisfied. And since we needn't include considerations of co-location in the base clauses there is no reason to expect that the ultimate explanation for why composition occurs will involve facts having to do with co-location. But even so, the presence of a co-location relation in the recursive clause seems objectionable.
	Problems #1-#3 are unlike the transitivity difficulty and the problem of disjoint decomposition in not being strictly logical problems, they are rather metaphysical problems. But for all that they remain troubling. Fortunately, problems #1-#3 will not force us to give up on series-style answers for we can provide a straightforward recursive clause purged of co-location relations which allows it to avoid problems #1-#3 in addition to resolving the logical difficulties.
	Before introducing the co-location-free replacement for (A*4) it will help to introduce a many-many composition relation:

Composition*
The xs compose* the zs =df each one of the xs is part of exactly one of the zs, every part of each one of the zs overlaps at least one of the xs, and no two of the xs overlap.

Composition* is unlike composition in that it obtains between pluralities rather than between a plurality and an object, and with it we can express a natural relation that can obtain between two pluralities. For example, we can say of any copse of trees that they are composed* of the collection of their cellulose molecules, and that the collection of a tree's cellulose molecules are composed* of the collection of it's particles.
	Now for our new answer to the SCQ for the treeish portion of the world:

(A**): For any xs [there is some y such that the xs compose y iff:

Base Clauses
(A*1) the xs are particles and stand in N, or 


(A*2) the xs are cellulose molecules and stand in B, or







(A*5) there are some zs and some w such that (the xs compose* the zs and the zs compose w)].

(A*) differs from (A**) only in its recursive clause, and the basic idea underlying the new recursive clause, (A*5), is that some xs may compose an object indirectly by virtue of being a group of things that compose* another group of things which in turn directly compose that object.
	(A*5) offers adequate solutions to the aforementioned problems. Because (A*5) involves only mereological relations it does not raise problems involving coincident objects or other more bizarrely co-located entities. Thus it can easily avoid problems #1 and #2. (A*5) also does not raise the dependence worries that (A*4) did because it makes facts about composition depend on other facts about composition, which is acceptable. Intuitively, if some cellulose molecules compose a tree, then the particles of those cellulose molecules also compose the tree but not in virtue of any direct composing relation they stand in to the tree. Rather they compose the tree in virtue of (a) the direct composing relation the cellulose molecules stand in to the tree and (b) the fact that each of cellulose molecules are directly composed of some particles. So problems #1-#3 are straightforwardly avoided with the use of (A*5).
	Can (A*5) help us avoid the transitivity difficulty and the problem of disjoint decomposition? Yes. Recall, the transitivity difficulty was that (A), (i), and (ii) imply that no particle is a proper part of any tree. To see that (A**), (i), and (ii) do not have that implication, consider some tree T. From (ii) it follows that there are some cellulose molecules, the cs, that compose T and that each of the cs is composed of some particles. Let the ps consist of exactly those particles that are proper parts of each one of the cs. From the right-to-left direction of (A**) it follows that the ps compose something because (A*5) is satisfied in the following way: the ps compose^{*} the cs and the cs compose T. Now, it's one thing to say that when the cs compose T there is something that the ps compose, but it's another thing to claim that the cs and the ps compose the same thing.​[29]​ So, could (A*5) be satisfied and the ps fail to compose T? That is, can the ps fail to compose T although the ps compose* the cs and the cs compose T? Not without generating a contradiction.​[30]​ Thus, we can show that the ps compose T and thus that each of the ps is a proper part of T. So (A**) resolves the transitivity difficulty.
	Finally, (A**) also resolves the problem of disjoint decomposition. As (D1) dictates, we need it to be the case that:

(D1a) The top-half of any tree's particles and the bottom-half of that same tree's cellulose molecules compose it.

With (A**) we can show that (D1a) follows given our assumptions about trees and their composition conditions.​[31]​
	Thus, (A**) is just as successful as (A*) in its ability to resolve the transitivity difficulty and the problem of disjoint decomposition but it has the further virtue of avoiding problems #1-#3.​[32]​

6 The proposed solution






(B1) the xs are F1 and stand in R1, or the xs are F2 and stand in R2, or ..., or the xs are Fn and stand in Rn, or







(R) there are some zs and some w such that (the xs compose* the zs and the zs compose w).

Clearly, (Series*) is not itself an answer to the SCQ but is rather a schematic form of an answer to that question. What I have been arguing for is the possibility that the correct answer to the SCQ has the form (Series*), at least if something along the lines of a common sense ontology is correct. For not only can an instance of (Series*) allow for a common sense ontology, but it can avoid two very problematic logical difficulties and the metaphysical problems #1-#3.

7 Some final remarks

In conclusion I wish to address three other, far less troubling problems van Inwagen has raised concerning series-style answers.​[33]​ First, van Inwagen objects that any series-style answer must employ mereological terms, which is, for some reason he does not make entirely clear, problematic.​[34]​ He calls this the circularity difficulty. I suspect that what undergirds this problem is the worry that employing mereological terms in an answer to the SCQ would make a series-style answer uninformative and viciously circular.​[35]​ However, so long as a series-style answer confines the occurrence of mereological terms to the recursive clause and provides sufficiently informative base clauses the circularity difficulty can be avoided.
	Second, van Inwagen locates a tension between series-style answers and the following principle:

Inclusion Thesis
If there are xs that compose something just in virtue of the fact that they stand in R, then, for any ys, if the ys stand in R, the ys compose something.​[36]​

But what tension there is between the Inclusion Thesis and series-style answers is unclear. For series-style answers deny that, at least in the most usual cases (e.g., bonding), that composition ever occurs among some xs just in virtue of the fact that the xs stand in R. Rather, the whole idea behind a series-style answer is that whether composition occurs among some xs partly depends on the kinds of things the xs are. Distinguish two kinds of series-style answers, one that implies that there is no relation R just in virtue of which any xs in R compose something. Call this a strong series-style answer. Such answers are, trivially, consistent with the Inclusion Thesis for, if correct, the antecedent of that thesis is false. Consider now a weak series-style answer, where such answers imply (a) that there are some relations whose ability to bring about composite objects depends on the kind to which the xs belong while also implying (b) that there are yet other relations whose ability to bring about composite objects does not depend on the kind to which the xs belong. A weak series-style answer has the virtue of allowing for an ontology of all and only ordinary objects while at the same time allowing that there is some special relation(s) R that have the power to bring about a composite object from any xs irrespective of their kind.​[37]​ Thus, a weak series-style answer is non-trivially consistent with the Inclusion Thesis. So whether a series-style answer is strong or weak, there is no tension with the Inclusion Thesis.
	Finally, van Inwagen thinks an answer to the SCQ should shed light on certain metaphysical puzzles like the ship of Theseus which concern the persistence and identity of material objects.​[38]​ But the trouble here is that the very nature of the SCQ is such that we should have no such expectation. The SCQ is a question about what it takes for some things to compose another, it is not a question about the persistence of composite objects nor is it a question about when “two” composite objects are identical. Notice further the the SCQ isn't even a question about when some things compose a particular kind of thing. For example, an answer to the SCQ may tell us that wooden planks compose something when in R, but it will not tell what kind of thing they compose when in R. So although an answer to the SCQ may shed light on puzzles concerning the persistence and identity of material objects, we should not hold it against an answer to the SCQ that it fails to do so.







^1	  Aime Thomasson [2007] sought to resolve this problem, but, for various reasons I canvass below, her proposed solution faces problems just as troubling as the problem it aimed to resolve. See note xxv below.
^2	  Van Inwagen [1990, 30-31]; Markosian [1998, 212].
^3	  Van Inwagen [1990, 29].
^4	  `In virtue of' indicates a dependence of some sort, and in general such relations are taken to have some explanatory value. Yet mere biconditionals indicate neither the existence of a dependence relation nor an explanatory relation holding between their relata. (Consider: Necessarily, 1=1 iff p implies possibly p.) For a recent exploration and defense of the in virtue of relation see Rosen [2010].
^5	  This is perhaps one way of expressing Markosian's [1998] view that facts about what composite objects exist are brute and without further explanation. His is one way of holding a common sense ontology without having to give up on parthood's transitivity, but it is also, for obvious reasons, a rather difficult view to accept.
^6	  Van Inwagen [1990, chapters 3 and 6].
^7	  The disjunct `or there is only one of the xs' is employed to preserve the convention that everything composes itself which is entailed by the definition of composition. See van Inwagen [1990, 63, 287 note 22]. We could do away with it if we limited our discussion to a proper composition relation, which is a composition relation that can obtain only among pluralities that have at least two distinct members. For convenience I follow van Inwagen by investigating the matter in terms of composition simpliciter.
^8	  Consistency with, as opposed to entailment of, the Levels-Kind Thesis is required for the subset of series-style answers we are interested in because the SCQ is a general question about when composition occurs, not about what it takes for some things of one kind to compose an object of a distinct kind. That is, a correct answer to the SCQ provides conditions for when it is true that there is some y such that the xs compose y. But this does not tell us what kind of thing it is that the xs compose, much less whether that thing is of the same or a different kind than the things which compose it.
^9	  Jay Rosenberg [1993], David Sanford [1993], and Amie Thomasson [2007, 130-136] explicitly endorse such an answer to the SCQ. Peter Simons [2006, 604-613] commits himself to such an answer by (a) maintaining that different kinds of “welding” relations bring about composite objects for different kinds of things and by (b) denying that any things in any welding relation compose something. See Rosenberg [1993] for a brief defense of the claim that Aristotle endorsed such an answer. Hoffman and Rosenkrantz [1997, 179-187] appear to find this type of answer to the SCQ most satisfying, as far as available answers go, but in the end they reject any answer to the SCQ. But many others are tacitly committed to series-style answers for anyone who thinks that facts about composition have an explanation, and that, say, humans bonded compose nothing while some non-human objects bonded may compose something is thereby committed to some series-style answer to the SCQ.
^10	  The example to follow differs in trivial ways from van Inwagen's. For convenience I write as though van Inwagen talked about my example. See van Inwagen [1990, 64-65].
^11	  If we did not limit our scope to stating composition conditions for the treeish portion of the world only, (A) would have to be a conditional claim. For whatever the correct answer to the SCQ is, it is intended to be a comprehensive answer that provides necessary and jointly sufficient composition conditions for anything whatsoever, not trees only. Since my purpose is to illustrate a problem with a certain way of answering the SCQ I've limited the portion of composite reality that we are trying to describe in order to retain the biconditional form that a correct and comprehensive answer would have.
^12	  Proper parthood is defined in terms of parthood (x is a proper part of y =df x is part of y and y is not part of x). The transitivity of proper parthood follows from our definition of proper part and the transitivity of parthood.
^13	  Van Inwagen [1990, 55]. (iv) is not our definition of, nor does it follow from our definition of, proper parthood alone. More on (iv) below.
^14	  ...or there is only one of them. But this can be overlooked since we assume no tree is composed of a single particle.
^15	  For discussion of parthood's transitivity see Rescher [1955], Johnston [2002], Lowe [1989, 94], Moltmann [1997] and [1998], Sanford [1993], Simons [1987, 11], van Inwagen [1990, 65], and Varzi [2006].
^16	  I'm grateful to Holly Kantin for pointing this out to me.
^17	  Although van Inwagen rests the case for (iv) on its intuitiveness alone [1990, 54-55].
^18	  Proof Sketch. The right-to-left direction of (iv) follows straightforwardly from our definition of composition. The right-hand side of (iv) entails that the zs composing y are each parts of y, and that y itself is precluded from being among the zs. Thus, each of the zs composing y are proper parts of y. 

	Deriving the left-to-right direction of (iv) is less straightforward. To do so we must involve the plural comprehension schema which is standardly involved in the formulation of plural languages and logics. Plural languages, typically, involve a denumerable set of plural comprehension axioms, 

 (Plural Comp) x(x)yyx(x<yy  (x))where  is a formula in the language in which at most `x' occurs free, and `yy' is a plural variable to be read `the ys', and `PREC' stand for the binary one-of relation. The import of the plural comprehension axioms is three-fold. First, it precludes the possibility of empty pluralities; second, it assures us that any object is among some plurality; and third, in conjunction with the logical truth [Vx(x=x)], the plural comprehension axiom implies that any object, x, is a member of at least one plurality that consists of exactly x. (See Boolos [1984], Linnebo [2003], and Rayo [2002] and [2006].)

	Now, for a reductio let us take the denial of the left-to-right direction of (iv), which, incidentally, is more easily understood if we represent it formally, letting `PP' represent proper parthood and `C' composition. Accordingly, from the denial of the left-to-right direction of (iv), and after a few rudimentary transformations, we get

(¬LtR) xy(xPPy & zzw(x=w OR (x/zz) or w/zz or not-zzCy))

which tells us that something, y, may have a proper part, x, which is either identical to everything, not among any plurality, or not among any plurality that compose y. 

	To see that (¬LtR) is unsatisfiable suppose a is a proper part of b and consider the second conjunct. The definition of proper part will not permit us the first disjunct; a cannot be identical to just any w since nothing prevents us from letting w=b which would contradict our assumption that a is a proper part of b. As for the second and third disjuncts, the plural comprehension schema, which is an axiom of plural languages (e.g., the language of formal mereology), will not permit them: plural comprehension tells us that any thing is one of some things. This leaves only the last disjunct, which tells us that there is no plurality that composes b. But this too is unsatisfiable since everything composes itself, and by the plural comprehension axiom and the logical truth Vx(x=x) we have it that for any object, x, x is a one of some things, zz, that consists of exactly x. Thus, b is one of some things cc such that nothing else is one of them and they compose b, contradicting the final disjunct. Therefore, the denial of the left-to-right direction of (iv), (¬LtR), is false.
^19	  In addition to the transitivity difficulty, van Inwagen poses another logical problem he calls the “circularity difficulty.” I discuss this in section 7.
^20	  The details involved in showing that the ps compose T will be set aside because there will ultimately be other problems with (A*4) which cause us to look for a replacement.
^21	  This is trivially satisfied whenever the object in question lacks proper parts. And, of course, `top-half' and `bottom-half' are just useful ways of specifying a subset of an object's proper parts, at least under the assumption that an even division of an object's parts is possible. For the purposes of the example I make that assumption.
^22	  Proof Sketch. Let `the as' name the top-half of y's proper parts at some level of disjoint decomposition, and let `the bs' name the bottom-half of y's proper parts at some other level of disjoint decomposition. Now let `the cs' name that plurality that consists of all the as and all the bs and nothing else. It is easy to see that the cs satisfy the first two conditions of our mereological definition of composition since each of the cs is a proper part of y which also implies that some part of y overlaps each one of the cs. The final condition for composition is satisfied because none of the cs overlap because (a) both the as and the bs come to us from levels of disjoint decomposition thus no two of the as overlap and no two of the bs overlap, and (b) the as fail to overlap the bs and vice versa because they each constitute a disjoint half of y.
^23	  In response to the transitivity difficulty Amie Thomasson [2007, 132] has proposed a non-standard definition of proper part which includes a recursive clause: “for x to be a proper part of y is for there to be zs other than x such that x joins with other zs to compose y, or, for some w, for x to be a proper part of w and w to be a proper part of y.” The intended significance of this emendation can be seen by observing that in such a mereology the following principle is true:(v) x is a proper part of y if and only if (there are zs other than x such that x and the zs compose y or there is some w such that x is a proper part of w and w is a proper part of y).Such a biconditional would appear to loosen the restriction on what it takes to be a proper part of something, thereby letting a tree's particles count as proper parts of it. For principle (v), when applied to our example involving trees, particles, and cellulose molecules, allows for the possibility that a particle may be a proper part of a tree provided it is a proper part of something that is a proper part of the tree, e.g., a cellulose molecule.	There are three problems with this solution. First, (v) is a logical consequence of any mereology that includes (iv) and (iii), so revising one's definition of proper part seems ill motivated. (Proof Sketch. The left-to-right direction of (v) is entailed by (iv). The right-to-left direction is provable by showing that each disjunct on the right-hand-side entails that x is a proper part of y. That the first disjunct does so is entailed, again, by (iv). That the second disjunct does so is entailed by the fact that proper parthood, like parthood, is a transitive relation. So that if x is a proper part of w and w is a proper part of y, then x is a proper part of y.) Second, if (A) and (i)-(iv) form an inconsistent set, then merely adding a further principle to it cannot make it consistent. Of course her proposal is that we not only add (v) but reject (iv). But rejecting (iv) commits one to rejecting some rather fundamental and plausible assumptions of the language and logic of mereology that was involved in the proof of (iv) given above. Finally, and most seriously, having (v) as part of one's mereology does not solve the fundamental problem. For we need it to be the case that not only is each particle that is part of a tree's cellulose molecule itself part of the tree, but it must also be the case that all of a tree's particles compose the tree. But in order for this to be the case (A), (i), and (ii) must be revised in such a way as to allow a collection of particles to compose a tree for they imply that particles compose only cellulose molecules, never trees. Thus, for example, although Thomasson's solution avoids the local problem of being able to claim that all of a tree's particles are proper parts of it, it does not allow us to say that they compose it. For the same reason Thomasson's solution founders on the problem of disjoint decomposition.
^24	  Coincident objects are distinct co-located objects that share all the same parts at the same time. See Rea [1997, xxix].
^25	  Take the plurality that consists just of the lump and the statue. This plurality is co-located with the plurality that consists exactly of the statue, and thus by the recursive clause it follows that the lump and the statue compose something further.
^26	  Perhaps this is how ghosts are imagined to pass through material objects.
^27	  There is a second difficulty here that is akin to problem #1 for it also follows that the anti-matter rod and the matter co-located with it compose some further object. See footnote 27.
^28	  I am grateful to Holly Kantin for pointing this out to me.
^29	  If coincidence occurs, then there may be multiple objects that the cs and the ps compose. This is fine so long as each object composed of the cs is also composed of the ps.
^30	  Proof Sketch. According to the definition of composition in order for the ps to fail to compose T it must be the case that: either (a) one of the ps is not a part of T, or (b) some part of T fails to be overlapped by one of the ps, or (c) at least two of the ps overlap. But none of these conditions, (a)-(c), can be satisfied in the present example where (A*5) is satisfied by the fact that (S): the ps compose* the cs and the cs compose T. Let's take these conditions in turn. First, since the cs compose T each of the cs is part of T, and since the ps compose* the cs each of the ps is part of one of the cs. Thus, from the transitivity of parthood it follows that each of the ps is part of T. Thus the first condition, (a), cannot be satisfied without contradicting our assumption (S). Second, since the ps compose^{*} the cs and the cs compose T, by our definitions of composition and composition*, it follows that each part of T is overlapped by at least one of the ps. Thus the second condition, (b), cannot be satisfied without contradicting our assumption (S). Finally, since the ps compose* the cs it follows that none of the ps overlap either. Thus the final condition, (c), cannot be satisfied given (S). Thus, since (a)-(c) cannot be satisfied when the cs compose T and the ps compose* the cs, by our definition of composition, the ps must also compose T.
^31	  Proof Sketch. To show this we take some arbitrary tree T, the cellulose molecules, the cs, which compose T, and the particles, the ps, that compose T. Now, let `the ms' consist of the top-half of T's particles and the bottom-half of T's cellulose molecules. Now we show that the ms compose T in two steps. First, we show that (A*5) is satisfied, thus implying that the ms compose something. Then we show that the ms compose T. 
	Step#1. We show that the ms compose something by showing that there are some other things that compose something which are composed* of the ms. Given our example we know that the cs compose T. Do the ms compose* the cs? Yes. Indeed, it is easy to see this given how we constructed the ms from the ps and the cs. For each one of the ms is part of exactly one of the cs, every part of each one of the cs overlaps at least one of the ms, and no two of the cs overlap. Thus because the ms compose* the cs and the cs compose T it follows by (A**) that the ms compose something. 

	Step#2. Because the cs compose T and because the ms compose* the cs, we can show that the ms must also compose T. Given our definition of composition, in order for the ms to fail to compose T it must be the case that: either (a) one of the ms is not a part of T, or (b) some part of T fails to be overlapped by one of the ms, or (c) at least two of the ms overlap. But none of these conditions, (a)-(c), can be satisfied in the present example. For given that all the ps and all the cs are parts of T and given that each one of the ms is either one of the ps or one of the cs it follows that each one of the ms is part of T. Thus (a) cannot be satisfied. Since the ms consist of the top-half of T's particles and the bottom-half of T's cellulose molecules it follows that no part of T fails to be overlapped by at least one of the ms. Thus (b) cannot be satisfied. Finally, since none of the ps overlap and none of the cs overlap and since the ms consists of the top-half of T's particles the bottom-half of T's cellulose molecules, it follows that none of the ms overlap either. Thus (c) cannot be satisfied. Therefore, since conditions (a)-(c) cannot be satisfied it follows that the ms compose T.
^32	  Our model series-style answer for when composition occurred at the treeish portion of the world, namely, (A**), went only two levels deep for it was a stipulated feature of the example that trees had only cellulose molecules and particles as proper parts. But in reality, most kinds of ordinary objects have many more levels of decomposition than two--at least if a common sense ontology is approximately correct. Will (Series*) be capable of solving the transitivity difficulty and the problem of disjoint decomposition as it arises in connection with any n-level disjoint decomposition of an object? Yes, so long as the base clauses are complete, specifying compositions conditions for any kind(s) of objects. For then there will be no level of disjoint decomposition that the base clauses fail to account for.
^33	  Van Inwagen [1990, 66-71] has other comments concerning series-style answers, but what follows seem to me to be the only comments that constitute arguments against series-style answers.
^34	  Van Inwagen [1990, 64-65, 30-31].
^35	  Markosian [1998] also interprets van Inwagen in this way, though he thinks van Inwagen is unnecessarily strict on this point. Alternatively, Markosian suggests that the ban should be on answers to the SCQ that make the special composition schema trivially true.
^36	  Van Inwagen [1990, 68-69].
^37	  Weak series-style answers will have a different from than their stronger counterparts, for they will need an additional base clause whose form is: the xs stand R1, or the xs stand in R2, or..., or the xs stand in Rn.
^38	  Van Inwagen [1990, 69-70].
